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Self-Understanding and Self-Deception
Between Existential Hermeneutics and Negativism
Emil Angehrn
1. The question of self-deception
1.1. The paradox of self-deception
Self-deception is a paradoxical matter.1 It seems impossible in principle and yet it 
presents an undeniable fact of human life. Classical figures such as Alexey Karenin 
and Homo Faber demonstrate the phenomenon of self-deception. The challenge 
to philosophical discussion lies in clarifying whether and how we are able to con-
sistently conceive of self-deception, and how and why it arises. None of these 
questions has an obvious answer. One may even doubt whether there exist gen-
uine cases of self-deception at all. Jean-Paul Sartre emphasized this challenge by 
interpreting the phenomenon of bad faith (mauvaise foi) in terms of lying to one-
self. He maintained that we are, in self-deception, confronted with an »evanescent 
phenomenon«, and that, despite its elusive nature, in practice self-deception takes 
a definite shape and is for many people a normal part of life; it is, Sartre concludes, 
a phenomenon that we can neither comprehend nor dismiss.2
But what exactly is the puzzle of self-deception? Philosophy and psychology 
mostly treats self-deception as an intentional act. However, it makes a difference 
if one is deceived by another or by oneself, or whether one is wrong about oneself. 
Deceiving seems related to the act of lying: just like the liar, the deceiver must 
know the truth that he conceals. Even in the case of unconscious dissembling, 
Sartre says, »I must know the truth very exactly in order to conceal it more care-
fully.«3 He who lies to himself, then, must first know what he denies or conceals. 
Lying to oneself exemplifies the peculiar state in which, according to Allen Wood, 
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»I must believe something as victim of the lie which as liar I disbelieve.«4 The 
task of philosophical reflection consists in describing the phenomenon of self-de-
ception without being taken in by its apparent conceptual contradictoriness, in a 
description that renders its factum consistent, comprehensive, and – not least – 
interesting.
1.2. How is self-deception possible?
Given the apparent contradiction of self-deception, the most immediate question 
tends to concern its very possibility. The most plausible way to tackle this ques-
tion is to distinguish between different dimensions in self-deceptive behavior. The 
psychoanalytical response refers to the unconscious. The assumption is that there 
exist, within the subject, non-conscious parts that conceal certain insights and give 
rise to false beliefs. In this way deceiver and deceived, and liar and belied become 
separate subjects. Other approaches to the problem replace the idea of a central, 
unified subject with one of a set of more or less mutually independent subsystems, 
thus dissolving the puzzling reflexivity of deceiving oneself. Still other conceptions 
deny Sartre’s presumption that the deceiver really has to be clear about what he 
conceals, or even go as far as to argue that being a rational subject does not neces-
sarily require being conscious of one’s own mental or cognitive states.5 Self-decep-
tion often originates in our unconscious wishes and unintentional biases. Self-de-
ception can arise from wishful thinking, and result in »honest lies.«
1.3. Sense and function of self-deception
However, none of the aforementioned conceptions seem to adequately cope with 
the dilemma resulting from the paradoxical nature of self-deception in that they 
fail to provide a rational explanation for it. In order to understand the phenome-
non, then, it seems necessary to change perspective and revise the original ques-
tion. I suggest a shift in focus from the question of how self-deception is possible, 
to that of how it arises, and what function it has. This question is one pertaining 
to the sense of self-deception, that is, the question of what purpose it serves, and 
what place and significance it has in human life. Obviously, self-deception has an 
important and often ambivalent role to play in our lives. In many situations, it 
is helpful and beneficial to deceive oneself – be it about the world, about others, 
or oneself. One can be interested in holding false beliefs without being able to 
acknowledge or – possibly – even be conscious of it. Illusions can facilitate life, lib-
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2010), 98.
erate the self from guilt and worries, and simplify complex situations. Self-decep-
tion not only presents an obstacle or a fallacy, but it also presents a means to make 
one’s life endurable. Even if attaining a logical grasp of the phenomenon is impos-
sible, it can nevertheless prove a successful problem-solving strategy. Self-decep-
tion can relieve (excessive) cognitive and moral demands, and – last but not least 
-can be useful, practically reasonable, and even kind and humane, despite remain-
ing irrational, psychologically dysfunctional, and perhaps morally problematic.6
1.4. What is at issue in self-deception?
The above way of characterising self-deception changes the perspective on what 
is actually at issue here. At first, it seemed that self-deception was an instance of 
ordinary deception, and thus mainly concerned generating false beliefs or pre-
venting the subject from acquiring true insights. It now becomes obvious that 
this approach is inadequate for recognizing what it is that makes self-deception 
a theoretical and practical problem. This is not to deny that some instances of 
self-deception follow this scheme. We might give in to illusions about our social 
status, our personal abilities or our real feelings. Seen from a more comprehensive 
viewpoint, however, it seems there is something else influencing the phenomenon 
and its typical manifestations; something that might turn out to be very important 
for the problem of self-deception. For the phenomenon of self-deception is not 
exhausted by generating and holding false beliefs about oneself, others, and the 
state of things. Indeed, errors of this kind can usually be corrected by reference 
to relevant facts, counter-evidence, or – sometimes – by showing how the errors 
came about. Self-deception, by contrast, appears to be a fundamental failure in 
the way we understand ourselves or the world. It presents a more basic deficiency 
in that it concerns not just our cognitive capacities, but our very selves. Distin-
guished from lying, self-deception comes closer to what existential philosophers 
refer to as inauthenticity, or existential self-deficiency. If we describe self-decep-
tion as a kind of privation,7 it not only amounts to a shortcoming of cognition 
but to a failure of understanding; more precisely, to a failure of one’s own strife 
towards understanding as such, to understanding oneself, and – finally – towards 
being oneself. In order to understand to what extent this kind of privation makes 
up an existential deficit, and thus presents a philosophical challenge, I first want to 
elucidate in what sense being is interwoven with understanding.
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 8 I. Kant, Logik, in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, vol. 9, ed. Königlich Preussische Akademie der 
Wissenschaften (Berlin / Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1923), 25 (my translation).
 9 F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, in Sämtliche Werke, vol. 5 (Kritische Studienausgabe 
in 15 Bänden), ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari (Berlin / New York, NY: dtv / de Gruyter, 1980), 81 
(my translation).
10 »L’existence précède l’essence« (J.-P. Sartre, L’existentialisme est un humanisme (Paris: Nagel, 
1946), 21); see also M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1963), 42.
11 C. Taylor, »Self-interpreting animals,« in C. Taylor, Philosophical Papers 1 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 45 – 76.
12 See E. Angehrn, »Selbstsein und Selbstverständigung. Zur Hermeneutik des Selbst,« in Die 
Vermessung der Seele. Konzepte des Selbst in Philosophie und Psychoanalyse, ed. E. Angehrn and 
J. Küchenhoff (Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2009), 163 – 183.
2. Being Oneself and Self-Deception
2.1. Human beings: (self-)understanding animals
In philosophy, »what is human being?« is not simply one question among others. 
For Kant, it is the main philosophical question, to which all key questions of phi-
losophy – what can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? – return, such 
that one can, as Kant says, »in principle, count all this to anthropology.«8 Remark-
ably, in modern philosophy, major schools of thought – particularly hermeneu-
tics and phenomenology – refuse to simply adopt the anthropological definition 
of the human being. They distance themselves both from so-called philosophical 
anthropology (Scheler, Plessner, Gehlen, Cassirer), which they perceive as built 
on empirical research in the humanities and social sciences, and from traditional 
metaphysics, which presupposes the existence of an invariable essence of human 
beings. They, instead, conceive of the human being as the »undetermined animal«9 
that gives itself its determination. Sartre and Heidegger radicalize this perspective 
so as to revert the relation of essence and existence.10 Sartre justifies this move by 
referring to the freedom of human beings to project themselves onto who they 
will be. Another motif of phenomenological thought complements this pivotal 
idea of modern thought: that of understanding.
According to Heidegger, humans are essentially understanding beings, who 
develop a certain understanding of themselves and the world. Human beings yield 
self-descriptions by means of which they are what they are. Charles Taylor refers 
to the human being as the self-interpreting animal, thus emphasizing the essen-
tial nature of this feature.11 Self-interpretation can thus be understood neither as 
a particular characteristic (such as upright walking or tool use), nor in terms of 
a metaphysical specific difference (such as reason or freedom) that defines the 
human being, but as a specific kind of relating to oneself by coming to an under-
standing of oneself. It is through a hermeneutics of the self that human beings 
accomplish the task of becoming who they are.12
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The cognitive relation at issue here exceeds that of the subject’s immedi-
ate self-awareness, which we describe as self-consciousness. It encompasses 
self-knowledge in the sense of factual knowledge of bodily characteristics, 
biographic data, and subjective attitudes as well as covert character traits, secret 
inclinations, and suppressed wishes. It encompasses everything, that is, that may 
become subject to spontaneous or methodical self-investigation. Self-knowledge 
in this sense is not restricted to making observations and giving causal explana-
tions. It aims at genuine understanding, at disclosing the meaning of one’s own 
biography, actions, and qualities; at grasping their significance for one’s being one-
self.
The transition from cognition to understanding and interpretation is charac-
terized by two things. First, reflexivity: We are concerned with a kind of knowledge 
that differs from the objectifying cognition of external facts. This is not simply to 
say that, from an internal perspective, we have privileged access to our own mental 
states and our subjective experience. Rather, it means that we possess a first-per-
son perspective from which to search, self-interpret, and self-describe. This genu-
inely first-personal perspective is related to what Taylor calls the »radical reflexiv-
ity« of the modern self.13 It is a kind of self-understanding that concerns a person 
in his very essence as a human being, as well as in his irreplaceable individuality; 
it is an attitude of understanding that no one except for himself can seek, acquire, 
and maintain. Secondly, this kind of understanding comprises both a theoretical 
and a practical relation to the self, and can be an instance of theoretical or practi-
cal self-ascription, self-knowledge, or self-determination. In particular instances, 
self-description unites forms of self-analysis and self-criticism; interpretation and 
projection; introspection and expression. All of these aspects contribute to a kind 
of self-reflection by means of which I become aware of myself and – first and fore-
most – by means of which I become (or fail to become) myself.
These considerations confirm that self-understanding aims not only at a cog-
nitive understanding of oneself. Rather, self-understanding strives for being, as 
contrasted with knowing: it is a way of finding and becoming oneself.
2.2. Limits of understanding: Hermeneutic negativism
It is, however, fully possible to embark on this route to self-knowledge and fail to 
reach it. The twofold aim of self-transparency and becoming oneself can be real-
ized, or it can be missed. Just like understanding in general, self-understanding 
is concerned with opaque and unintelligible matters; with the fragility of sense. 
Facing the usual problem of hermeneutics, hermeneutics of the self is always con-
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cerned with the limits of sense; with understanding in tension with non-under-
standing.14
We can distinguish four ways in which we, as humans, are confronted with the 
boundaries of sense and the problems of understanding. Firstly, not all objects are 
accessible to the understanding and available for interpretation. There is an onto-
logical distinction between beings that are in principle understandable and beings 
that are not. We access the world in two fundamentally different ways. On the 
one hand, we encounter things and states of affairs in the realm of nature, which 
we describe from the outside and try to explain by reference to external causes. 
On the other hand, we deal with objects in the human world (tools, actions, tra-
ditions, historical events), which we try to understand by their signification. The 
19th – 20th century neo-Kantian tradition used the ontological distinction between 
two types of being (nature and culture; matter and mind) as conceptual basis for 
the separation between the natural sciences and the humanities. We understand a 
conference, but we do not understand – at least not in the same sense – the struc-
ture of a crystal. In special cases, there are interferences between these realms, 
where the senseful and the senseless permeate one another. In the last decades, 
phenomenologists, deconstructivists, and cultural theorists have focused on the 
exteriority of sense and the materiality of communication. Meaningful phenom-
ena are embedded in a context that we cannot make sense of in the same way but 
which may still affect their signification. Generally, however, we deal with external 
borders of the hermeneutic space, which do not interfere with our will to under-
stand in any particular way.
Secondly, we deal with objects that in principle carry certain meaning, which, 
however, we are unable to understand in the concrete situation. Ancient texts, 
exotic cultures, and pathological behavior are all objects whose meaning we find 
difficult to grasp. In such cases, there exists a temporal, cultural, or social distance 
between production and reception of sense, which stands in the way of our under-
standing. The hermeneutic work aims to mediate between the production and the 
reception of sense by way of explications, translations, and interpretations. This 
is, so to speak, the normal condition of hermeneutics. An ideal comprehension 
would consist of a convergence between the sense as it was originally intended, 
and its reconstruction by the reader or observer. In what respect and by what 
means a complete understanding can be reached depends on the topic at hand as 
well as on the methodical orientation with which it is approached. One may raise 
the question of how far we are capable of achieving a clear and full understanding 
at all. Many theorists hold that sense cannot be universalized, and that every inter-
pretation encounters an undissolved remainder. Human behavior, histories, and 
emotions are too complex to be analyzed in their entirety. Classical hermeneutics, 
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as well as critical conceptions – e. g. deconstruction – insist on the openness and 
infiniteness of interpretation. But even if understanding remains open and incom-
plete, the discussion concerns something that is in principle intelligible, i. e. some-
thing that is »not yet« understood by the reader or observer, but which decipher-
ment, contextualization, and interpretation shall gradually help transfer into sense.
Thirdly, the limits of sense concern an expression that is unintelligible even 
to the subject who expresses it. The hermeneutic problem does not, in this case, 
concern the distance between reader and author, but the latter’s distance from 
himself. Paul Ricœur’s paradigmatic »hermeneutics of suspicion« deals with pre-
cisely this. There, Ricœur talks about utterances that appear obscure and incom-
prehensible to the speaking and acting subjects themselves. Examples of such 
distorted and obfuscated expression include pathological symptoms, ideological 
beliefs, and demonstrations of the will to power, as described by Freud, Marx, 
and Nietzsche – a trio Ricœur refers to as the »masters of suspicion.« Meanwhile, 
these types of expression indicate a more general issue in hermeneutics, namely 
that we are strangers to ourselves; that utterances are opaque in themselves. To a 
certain extent, this defines the normal condition of speaking and understanding. 
We encounter problems not only in our communication with others, but also in 
self-reflection, and in trying to understand our own feelings and intentions. For 
Gadamer, the gap between meaning and saying, the speaker’s search for the right 
words, and our failure to completely express our intentions constitute the inner-
most core of the hermeneutic problem. In concrete situations, both limits of sense, 
not understanding oneself, and not understanding the other, can interfere with 
and reinforce one another. A lack of transparency can occur in the communica-
tion between subjects, but also on the speaker’s side, or the hearer’s, and it is obvi-
ous that this manifold opacity aggravates the difficulty of understanding. Someone 
who is unclear about themselves will have even more difficulty unravelling the 
alienness of the other.
Finally, there is a fourth negation of sense, where an utterance is not only unin-
telligible to others or in itself, but where it directly opposes understanding and 
meaning as such. Examples of this include manifest nonsense, absurd sentences, 
and contradictions in speech or action. However, from the perspective of herme-
neutics, the problem concerns not only, nor primarily, linguistic inconsistencies 
and theoretical rule violations. The negation of sense as addressed here refers, 
rather, to a practical negation. There are states of affairs that – due to their intrinsic 
negativity – can be neither justified, rationalized, or even understood. Ever since 
its conception, this problem has continued to pose a crucial challenge and prov-
ocation to rational thinking in theology, anthropology, and metaphysics. Every 
attempt to rationally explain the origin of evil, be it malum physicum or malum 
morale, as suffering, or as sin, seemed to result into an insolvable aporia. The lim-
its of sense, however, appear more radical than the pure impossibility of a ratio-
nal explanation or justification of evil. The limits already occur as a limit of lan-
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guage; in the inability to express anxiety and shame, to remember, and to articulate 
extreme suffering. Victims of violence fall silent, and traumatic experiences are 
expulsed from consciousness. The most basic hermeneutic challenge consists in 
regaining speech, and the most urgent task of negative dialectics is, according to 
Adorno, to »lend a voice to suffering.«15
Now, all these limitations of speech and understanding are lodged in self-un-
derstanding. They indicate deficiencies that are not just cognitive in nature. For 
the subject, being situated on a continuum between the poles of understanding 
and non-understanding means being affected in their very state of being. The lim-
its of self-understanding originate partly in the subject’s constitutive limitedness, 
partly in contingent restraints, and partly in fundamental problems of existence. 
There exists in us a fundamental structural inability to achieve encompassing 
transparency and rational comprehension of the self; a blind spot of (self-)knowl-
edge that precludes full self-transparency. This structural boundary is reinforced 
by our human dependency on historical and social conditions, as well as by our 
particular physical and psychological constitutions. No one is capable of becom-
ing (fully) aware of his or her own specific existence. We have only partial access 
to our biography, our cultural condition, and our affective moods. What we are 
and what we feel, how we became what we are, and even what we really mean and 
want is never entirely available to us. At the same time, our efforts to understand 
ourselves may fail due to negative experiences or repressed parts of our character 
that we refuse to assimilate into our self-image. Finally, the problem of self-under-
standing is radicalised when we expand the concern beyond the subject matter 
and into the understanding as such. That is, apart from the obscurity of the subject 
matter, also the subject’s own constitution resists understanding.
We are here concerned with a kind of self-inhibition for which the subject bears 
responsibility – whether it derives from inertia, internal resistance, or self-made 
inability. This is, after all, not a deficit in the capacity for self-understanding, but 
in one’s striving for understanding oneself, which – in extreme cases – turns into 
a denial of even trying to understand oneself. In such cases, self-understanding 
is not endangered by the withdrawal of the subject-matter from understanding, 
but by the internal ambivalence of self-understanding. What is endangered here is 
not only the subject’s (self-)knowledge, but the subject’s very being. The denial of 
understanding itself stands for the denial of being oneself.
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3. Self-deception and self-deficiency
3.1. Self-deception and akrasia
The above aspects of self-deception reveal its relation to another traditional prob-
lem of philosophy: the problem of akrasia, or weakness of the will. This relation-
ship is not confined to the two phenomena sharing a nearly unintelligible para-
doxical structure while presenting a contrasting familiarity in everyday life. More 
importantly, the relation becomes visible when we analyze self-deception against 
the background of the failure to understand oneself and when we find this failure 
to be rooted in a weakness or denial of the will.
So far, my analysis has gradually developed the failure of understanding from 
not understanding to being unwilling to understand and, finally, to being unwilling 
to understand oneself. The failure of understanding thus leads to a kind of reflec-
tive unwillingness, more precisely to a contradictoriness within the subject’s will, 
whereby the subject simultaneously does and does not will. Practical contradicto-
riness may seem less problematic than its theoretical counterpart since it makes 
more sense to have contradicting desires and intentions16 than to make contra-
dicting judgments and assertions. On second glance, however, contradictoriness 
of the will presents a point of existential distress as much as a conceptual para-
dox. Akrasia is not about a tension between intentions with mutually incompatible 
content, but about a dissociation of the will. In a sense, it concerns a performative 
contradiction within one and the same disposition of the will.17 The same goes for 
self-deception: it, too, is not primarily concerned with contradictory contents, i. e. 
with our meaning or wanting something whilst making ourselves believe some-
thing else, but with an internal dissonance of the will, the inconsistency of which is 
aggravated in the case of self-understanding. For in this case, one’s (un)willingness 
concerns not a contingent aim, like quitting smoking, but something fundamental 
to our very existence. Willingness to understand and willingness to be are forms of 
willing that constitute the essence of human being. Nietzsche’s suspicion that man 
is not at all interested in truth, and Heidegger’s remark that the refusal to know 
complies with our everyday way of being both refer to counter-tendencies to the 
fundamental tendency of life, which is directed at truth and knowledge.18
E-Offprint of the Author with Publisher’s Permission
Emil Angehrn78
19 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, §§ 27, 35 – 38.
20 Beier, Selbsttäuschung, 5. The key to her explication is the concept of privation, specifically 
that the phenomenon of self-deception logically, explanatorily, and normatively depends on another 
one, namely the concept of self-determination.
3.2. Existential deficiency and self-alienation
Having traced self-deception back to a basic reversion of the will, it seems less like 
a cognitive deficit, and more like an existential weakness; a fundamental failure of 
the human being. The reversion sees the subject becoming at odds with himself, 
eventually resulting in self-alienation. In this state, the subject approximates what 
existentialists have called inauthenticity, and what philosophers in related fields 
refer to as a subject’s disagreement with himself; a fundamental self-deficiency. 
The questions are what does this deficiency consist in, where does it originate, and 
what does it mean for human life?
According to Heidegger, inauthenticity is the normal condition of the human 
being, a condition, he says, that obtains »proximally and for the most part.« 
Although Heidegger insists that his talk of everydayness and inauthenticity does 
not carry a pejorative sense, the negative connotations are obvious in that this 
state is the opposite of the ideal of existing »authentically.«19 The reason that we 
do not meet this ideal is either that authenticity is a constitutive or, alternatively, 
a contingent feature of human life. Inauthenticity is an essential feature of human 
existence inasmuch as it reflects the finiteness of human beings, and their depen-
dency on physical and mental, historical and social conditions. The imperfection 
and inauthenticity of human existence is constitutive of its anthropological nature. 
In contrast, self-deception seems contingent whenever it derives from additional, 
contingent circumstances. Critics of ideology interpret the delusion of conscious-
ness as an effect of being mastered by another, while psychoanalysts investigate it 
as an effect of internal pathologies of the mind. Experiences of the reality of neg-
ativity, of illness, violence, and injustice can deprive the subject of the possibility 
of coming to terms with himself and of making sense of the world. Philosophers 
of history and culture understand the disintegration of the individual in the con-
text of a social crisis or an encompassing decline of civilisation. Nonetheless, the 
question remains how far the grounds for the inadequacy and inherent falsity of 
existence lie within the subject himself.
3.3. The origin of self-alienation
Basically, this is the case if non-identity is regarded part of the ontology of the 
subject. Kathi Beier maintains that the phenomenon of self-deception can be ade-
quately explicated only in ontological, rather than epistemological or psychologi-
cal, terms.20 Sartre trenchantly points to self-deception being a matter of ontology 
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23 Ibid., 97 (my translation).
24 Ibid., 85.
25 Ibid., 111.
26 M. Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2002), 
20.
27 M. Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänom-
enologische Forschung (Wintersemester 1921 / 22), in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 61, ed. W. Bröcker and 
K. Bröcker-Oltmanns (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985), 154.
28 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 177 (my translation).
29 Epistle to the Romans 7:15, 7:17.
when he proceeds from the question »what Man must be in his being if it ought to 
be possible for him to deny himself«21 and responds that the necessary condition 
of inauthenticity consists in »that, primordially, I am and am not what I am.«22 
His classical and obstinately repeated thesis reads that the human being is a being 
»that is what it is not, and is not what it is.«23 In how far such an answer satisfac-
torily elucidates the phenomenon is open to doubt. The paradoxical behavior at 
hand is traced to a paradoxical essence. Importantly, Sartre interprets the implicit 
negation not only as a constative, but also a performative one that is present in 
inauthenticity as self-denial, or as flight from one’s own being.24 The ontological 
structure of the subject ensures that (self-)consciousness is not only inauthentic, 
but also in perpetual danger of falling prey to inauthenticity.25 We are concerned 
with a tendency that is due not just to an ontological weakness, but to a tendency 
that has ethical implications, and presents a danger to what human beings want 
and ought to be, and not merely to their projects. In a sense, Heidegger appre-
hends the ontological-ethical perspective against a religious background and 
paraphrases it in religious terms. Instead of speaking simply of a human danger 
or a constitutive »inclination« to fall into inauthenticity, he speaks of temptation.26 
Although Heidegger explicitly emphasizes that this must not be understood in a 
religious sense, the question concerning the grounds of inauthenticity is associ-
ated with the question concerning the origin of evil.27 The danger is replaced with 
the »continuous temptation« to fall: the human being, says Heidegger, is essentially 
»temptable,« that is, susceptible to the propensity for evil as Kant describes it.28 
The Christian tradition’s cycle of temptation, falling, and redemption is inscribed 
in the deep structure of subjectivity; in the contrasts between falling and authen-
ticity, concealment and truth. In a certain analogy to Sartre’s paradoxical formula, 
The Epistle to the Romans describes the contradictoriness of the will and locates 
its origin in evil: »For what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I;« »Now 
then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me.«29
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3.4. Anxiety (Angst) as the origin of self-deficiency – the challenge to freedom
These and other dogmatic descriptions remain conceptually unsatisfactory insofar 
as they derive the negative from the negative. Temptation refers to the devil as the 
principle and instigator of evil. The same goes for considerations that, referring to 
the later Freud’s drive theory, declare the death instinct or the destructive drive 
the core of the willing subject’s self-inversion. Such conceptions are supposed to 
fill the explanatory gap that opens up when we speak of anthropological weakness 
and finiteness, which can only explain the possibility – not the actuality – of evil 
and self-destructive behavior. Ricœur finds a similar gap in the anthropology of 
fallibility, which comprehends only the disposition, not the act, of evil. The act 
remains theoretically unexplainable and can only be explicated by way of narra-
tives of the Fall of Man and the symbols of evil.30
It is possible to carry out an analogous hermeneutic reflection on the basis of 
Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s respective theories of angst. Angst is here inextrica-
bly intertwined with the problem of freedom while simultaneously entangled with 
the origin of (self-)deficiency.31 Angst originates in the experience of freedom, the 
confrontation with indeterminacy, and the unfixedness of the possibilities onto 
which human beings project themselves. Generally associated with a lack of deter-
minacy and diffusion of boundaries, angst is in its core directed towards insecu-
rity. The temptation consists in escaping this fundamental uncertainty by means 
of determination. The attempt to escape from freedom is the primordial ground 
of self-deficiency, and leads to inauthenticity. The original temptation aims at our 
arranging ourselves within the actual world in order to escape from that basic fear. 
Authentic existence thus requires that we withstand this fear and take responsibil-
ity in the face of contingency, confusion, and instability.
The relation between fear and freedom refers back to self-deception. It is 
obvious that self-deception is often rooted in fear. Phenomenally, self-deception 
appears as a motivated, though unintentional, disguise of unpleasant facts. Experi-
ences of pain, shame, and fear can lead us to close our eyes to facts and soothe our-
selves with false assumptions. This suppression and cultivation of illusion brings 
reassurance, relief, and release. Heidegger holds that the general »burden« of Das-
ein, who is responsible for itself and »has to be,« causes Dasein to for the most part 
avoid self-disclosure.32 Dasein has even more reason to do so if it has to cope with 
suffering and guilt, or has to find orientation in a meaningless world. This picture 
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presents self-deception as the paradigmatic manifestation of inauthenticity. It not 
only waives the challenge of negativity but denies it, replacing it with a false image 
of the world and the self.
Still, there is more at issue here than surmounting particular instances of suf-
fering and contradiction. The deep structure of the phenomenon is framed by fear 
less of this or that particular danger or lack of sense than of the chasm of one’s 
own freedom. The most fundamental kind of self-alienation threatening human 
beings consists in alienation from their own freedom. This is not overcome by 
Marx’s or Hegel’s suggested removal of objectification, and undoing of external-
isation. This kind of self-alienation takes place within the boundaries of the self, 
before any kind of externalisation can occur; it represents a kind of deficiency that 
resides at the very heart of subjectivity.
Let me try to draw a conclusion. The train of thought I have developed here has 
led us from self-deception to self-understanding and its failure, to unwillingness, 
and finally to the fear of freedom. Along this road, I have laid out a fundament and 
a core element of self-alienation, both in a double sense.
On the one hand, the burden and fear of freedom was shown to be the prob-
lem that actuates human self-alienation. Fear of freedom is the foundation of all 
self-estrangement, since it defines the deepest ground of a subject’s fear of itself.
On the other hand, the problem of understanding and self-deception brought 
me to consider self-estrangement. Although self-alienation could consist in 
alienation from one’s primary needs, duties, and own nature, its core still lies in 
alienation from self-understanding and – ultimately – from the willingness to 
understand oneself. This kind of self-understanding forms the basis for all other 
dimensions of self-relatedness, self-projection, as well as acceptance of one’s own 
biography, characteristics, feelings, and inclinations. Whenever a human being’s 
fear threatens their willingness to understand themselves, a kind of estrangement 
takes effect that is prior to all other kinds of self-alienation. Self-deception pres-
ents not only a paradigmatic case, but a core of self-alienation.
